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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRA-
TION OF STATE TAX LAWS-TAX INJUNCTION ACT-The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a state
remedy designed to provide relief for aggrieved taxpayers on an
individual basis is not "plain, speedy and efficient" within the
meaning of the Tax Injunction Act when plaintiffs need and seek
class-wide relief from racially discriminatory assessment of property
taxes.
Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
485 (1976).
In 1975, Donald Garrett and two other property owners filed a
class action in federal district court seeking injunctive relief against
the Board of Assessment Appeals of Berks County, Pennsylvania.,
They alleged that the Board was intentionally using a racially dis-
criminatory method of property assessment in violation of the four-
teenth amendment.' The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the case, holding that the
plaintiffs' available state remedies were "plain, speedy and effi-
cient" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act,3 and a federal
court was therefore barred from asserting jurisdiction over the dis-
pute.'
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
1. Garrett v. Bamford, 394 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 538 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976). The individual members of the Board of Assessment Appeals
were also named as defendants in the suit.
2. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) their properties were assessed at values higher than values
assigned to similar properties in predominantly or exclusively white areas of Berks County,
and (2) their assessments represented a greater percentage of their properties' actual value
than did the assessments in white areas. The plaintiffs claimed this was the result of the
Board's failure to assess the properties on an annual basis as required by state law, combined
with an alleged increase in property values in white neighborhoods. 394 F. Supp. at 903-04.
3. The Act provides that the district courts "shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as § 1341].
4. 394 F. Supp. at 908.
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the Third Circuit.5 They conceded that both statutory' and equit-
able7 remedies were theoretically available to them in Pennsylvania
state courts. They contended, however, that the statutory remedy
would provide only piecemeal relief which would be neither plain,
speedy nor efficient and that the availability of an equitable remedy
was, in practice, uncertain. Thus, the sole issue before the court of
appeals was whether either of the plaintiffs' state remedies were
adequate in the context of class-wide relief from the alleged discrim-
inatory assessment of state taxes. The circuit court determined that
neither remedy was adequate, and unanimously reversed and re-
manded the case for a judgment on the merits by the district court.'
The court's construction of the Tax Injunction Act and its familiar
language, "plain, speedy and efficient," disposed of the issue.'
Construing those words to have the same meaning as "adequate,"
the court reviewed the Act's legislative history and was convinced
that challenges to state tax assessments were not barred from fed-
eral equity courts when the challenges were based on federal law and
when the available state remedies were "inadequate to the task."'
The Third Circuit first discussed Pennsylvania's equitable rem-
edy and began with the premise that to prove the inadequacy of a
state equitable remedy, a plaintiff need only show that its availabil-
ity is uncertain." The court reviewed recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decisions on the scope of equity jurisdiction in tax matters. 2
Its survey revealed a pattern of changing standards used by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for determining when equity courts
5. Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
6. The applicable Pennsylvania statutory remedy is contained in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§§ 5342-50 (Supp. 1976). The statute establishes a Board of Assessments and provides that
the Board shall annually assess properties. Id. §§ 5342, 5344. It further provides that ag-
grieved taxpayers may appeal to the Board for relief and authorizes judicial review of the
Board's decision. Id. 88 5349, 5350.
7. See note 13 infra for a discussion of the availability of Pennsylvania's equitable reme-
dies.
8. 538 F.2d at 72-73.
9. See note 3 supra for the full text of the Act.
10. 538 F.2d.at 67.
11. Id. See Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 624, 626 (1946) (uncer-
tainty surrounding taxpayer's state remedy justified federal jurisdiction); Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1944) (uncertainty of an adequate state
remedy justified federal jurisdiction). See also H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 979 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
12. See 538 F.2d at 68-70.
Vol. 15: 295
1976-77 Recent Decisions
should intervene; the Pennsylvania justices were in substantial dis-
agreement on the issue. 3 The court of appeals concluded that had
Garrett been brought in a Pennsylvania court, Rochester & Pitts-
burgh Coal Co. v. Board of Assessment4 should have controlled, and
under the Rochester standards 5 a state equity court would have
been denied jurisdiction. Yet Pennsylvania cases decided after
Rochester made it questionable whether the Pennsylvania courts
also would have considered Rochester to be controlling. Rather than
rely on its choice of controlling state precedent, the circuit court
determined that the availability of the equitable remedy was uncer-
tain and this alone was sufficient to demonstrate inadequacy under
the Tax Injunction Act."
The court next analyzed the adequacy of the state's statutory
remedy-appeal to an administrative board followed by judicial
review." Since Pennsylvania's administrative remedy for aggrieved
taxpayers was statutorily prescribed, 8 any conclusion of inadequacy
13. As recently as 1965, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that where a contro-
versy involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a taxing statute or ordinance, equity has
jurisdiction despite the availability of an adequate remedy at law. Studio Theatres, Inc. v.
City of Washington, 418 Pa. 73, 209 A.2d 802 (1965) (suit to enjoin enforcement of local
privilege tax). Studio Theatres was upheld in Lynch v. Owen J. Roberts School Dist., 430
Pa. 461, 244 A.2d 1 (1968) (suit to enjoin school district from collecting occupational taxes).
Justice Cohen dissented in both decisions, arguing that where a remedy is statutorily pro-
vided, that remedy should be pursued exclusively, without interference from courts of equity.
418 Pa. at 80, 209 A.2d at 806; 430 Pa. at 471, 244 A.2d at 6. His view was adopted by a court
majority two years later in Rochester & Pgh Coal Co. v. Board of Assessment, 438 Pa. 506,
266 A.2d 78 (1970). Rochester held that equity would have no jurisdiction in tax cases unless
(1) the case involved a substantial constitutional question, and (2) there was no adequate
statutory remedy. Id. at 508, 266 A.2d at 79. In 1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made
an effort to reconcile these opinions by affirming Rochester but adding that when the question
raised is one directly involving the constitutional validity of a taxing statute, equity could
intervene. Borough of Greentree v. Board of Property Assessments, 459 Pa. 268, 328 A.2d 819
(1974). The Third Circuit considered these conflicting opinions and concluded that the avail-
ability of an equitable remedy to the Garrett plaintiffs was uncertain. The court stated that
such uncertainty was sufficient to render the remedy inadequate. See note 11 and accompany-
ing text supra.
14. 438 Pa. 506, 266 A.2d 78 (1970).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. 538 F.2d at 70. See note 11 supra and authorities cited therein. Cf. Tully v. Griffin,
97 S. Ct. 219 (1976) (Supreme Court vacated district court's grant of preliminary injunction
which restrained collection of New York taxes on grounds that there was no state authority
to support the district court's conclusion that availability of state equitable remedy was
uncertain).
17. 538 F.2d at 70-72.
18. See note 6 supra.
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could not be based upon the uncertainty of an available remedy.
The court instead based its determination upon a practical exami-
nation of the consequences facing the appellants were they left to
seek this remedy. In its view, the administrative remedy was clearly
designed to enable an individual taxpayer to appeal his particular
assessment; it was not designed for class-wide relief.'9 Pennsyl-
vania's lack of a class mechanism would force the appellants to
incur individual expenses which would in all likelihood be prohibi-
tive to persons of their economic status.'" Furthermore, the statu-
tory remedy would necessitate an inefficient multiplicity of suits;
each taxpayer would have to make an individual appeal of his as-
sessment to obtain relief, both initially and again in future years if
the discriminatory assessments were repeated.2' The court reasoned
that since these problems could be effectively avoided only through
a class action, 2 the plaintiffs' administrative remedy in Pennsyl-
vania was also inadequate.2 1 It was therefore proper for a federal
court of equity to entertain the suit.
The significance of Garrett lies in the Third Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the words "plain, speedy and efficient" as they appear in the
Tax Injunction Act. That language is an outgrowth of a basic princi-
ple of federal equity practice, articulated by the Supreme Court in
Matthews v. RodgersN4 several years prior to passage of the Act. In
dictum, the Matthews Court stated that federal courts should re-
frain from asserting equitable jurisdiction in state tax cases when
the remedy at law was "plain, adequate and complete.12 '
Prior to Matthews, federal courts were deprived of equitable juris-
diction only where there was an adequate federal remedy at law; an
19. 538 F.2d at 70.
20. The court interpreted the Pennsylvania statute as requiring that each plaintiff bring
a separate action for review of his assessment. Although the costs of gathering the necessary
evidence probably could have been shared, each plaintiff would have to pay his own filing
fees and expenses for attorneys and expert witnesses. A class action would permit consolida-
tion of these costs. See generally C.A. WRIGHT & A.R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1751 (1969).
21. The plaintiffs would be entitled to bring a class action in federal court since their case
meets the prerequisites listed in FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(b)(2).
22. 538 F.2d at 72, citing Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) (equity has jurisdiction
to allow complainant to avoid a multiplicity of suits).
23. 538 F.2d at 72.
24. 284 U.S. 521 (1932) (attacking constitutionality of Mississippi statute which allegedly
violated the commerce clause).
25. Id. at 525.
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adequate state legal remedy would not of itself bar federal equity
jurisdiction."6 The Supreme Court in Matthews, however, indicated
that the lower federal courts should withhold equitable relief in
state tax cases when an adequate legal remedy was available in the
federal or state courts.27 The decision did relatively little to deter
federal intervention. Federal courts were easily persuaded that state
remedies were inadequate where relief was uncertain, expensive or
would require a multiplicity of suits. 2 In addition, after Matthews,
some courts continued to apply the earlier equity doctrine, requiring
only the absence of an adequate federal legal remedy before equity
jurisdiction would obtain.29 Thus, the exercise of federal equity ju-
risdiction remained largely unrestrained despite Matthews-a situ-
ation which Congress considered deplorable due to its disruptive
effects on state and local revenues.30
26. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Osborne, 265 U.S. 14, 16 (1924) (adequate remedy
in the state courts not sufficient in itself to bar federal equity jurisdiction). See also 37 YALE
L.J. 378 (1928).
Application of this doctrine enabled foreign corporations to seek federal injunctions and
withhold needed revenues from the taxing state during the course of the federal litigation.
This was due to the fact that the federal remedy at law was a suit for refund, which was
necessarily inadequate as to foreign corporations due to the eleventh amendment's bar
against suit of a state in federal court by a citizen of another state. See Note, Federal
Declaratory Judgments on the Validity of State Taxes, 50 YALE L.J. 927, 928 n.4 (1941). For
a discussion of congressional disapproval of this practice see note 30 and accompanying text
infra.
27. See Note, Jurisdiction to Enforce Federal Statutes Regulating State Taxation: The
Eleventh Amendment-Section 1341 Imbroglio, 70 YALE L.J. 636, 642 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Jurisdiction]. See also 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE T 0.207 (2d ed. 1948). The
Matthews Court stated:
The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should
at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunc-
tion with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case
where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.
284 U.S. at 525.
28. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (state remedy uncertain).
See also Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes,
59 H.av. L. REV. 780, 782-83 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Federal Interference]; Jurisdiction,
supra note 27, at 642 n.44.
29. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 20 F. Supp. 940, 944 (N.D. Cal. 1937), aff'd
sub nom. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) (test for adequacy of remedy
at law is the legal remedy afforded in the federal forum); Fort Worth v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 80 F.2d 972, 973 (5th Cir. 1936) (there must be an adequate federal remedy at law
to bar federal equity jurisdiction). See also Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 642 n.44.
30. See Federal Interference, supra note 28, at 783. Congressional concern centered
around the federal courts' practice of entertaining injunction suits brought by foreign corpora-
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The Tax Injunction Act was passed to remedy this situation.3
The Act made it clear that an adequate state remedy would be
sufficient to bar federal jurisdiction.32 It also required that both the
state's legal and equitable remedies be found inadequate before
federal equity courts could intervene.33 Not only did the Tax Injunc-
tion Act by its own force restrict federal intervention in state tax
matters, but the words "plain, speedy and efficient" were initially
interpreted as establishing a more lenient standard to be met by
state remedies in order to foreclose federal jurisdiction.34 Lower fed-
eral courts began to reject undue expense, multiplicity of suits, and
uncertainty of the state remedy as sufficient grounds to support a
finding of inadequacy of state remedies under the Act. 5
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court indicated that such a re-
strictive interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act was unintended.
In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,31 a case involving a
constitutional challenge to a state privilege tax, the Court used the
words "plain, speedy and efficient" and "adequate" interchange-
ably. Justice Frankfurter stated that if the adequacy of a state's
remedy was uncertain, the federal courts were permitted to
exercise jurisdiction despite the language of the Act.37 Since the
tions against state officers. This practice made it possible for large corporations to withhold
taxes during the course of the federal litigation, disrupting the fiscal affairs of the states
involved. In a Senate Judiciary Committee report recommending the Act's passage it was
observed:
The pressing needs of these States for this tax money is so great that in many instances
they have been compelled to compromise these suits, as a result of which substantial
portions of the tax have been lost . . . without a judicial examination into the real
merits of the controversy.
S. Rap. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (remarks of Senator Connally).
31. See note 3 supra for the text of the Act.
32. See Norton v. Cass County, 115 F.2d 884, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1940) (test for federal equity
jurisdiction is adequacy of the state remedy rather than an adequate legal remedy in federal
court).
33. Id. at 886; Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska Bd. of Equalization & Assess-
ment, 105 F. Supp. 188, 194 (D. Neb. 1952) (state remedy providing for injunctive or declara-
tory relief held to be "plain, speedy and efficient").
34. For a discussion of the merits of this interpretation see generally Federal Interference,
supra note 28.
35. For cases decided after the Act's passage, in which federal courts rejected prior ele-
ments of inadequacy such as uncertainty, expense, and multiplicity of suits see id. at 784
n.19.
36. 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
37. Id. at 105-06. See also Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946)
(uncertainty of an adequate state remedy justified federal jurisdiction).
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uncertainty of a state's remedy had also warranted a finding of
inadequacy under the standard used prior to the Act's passage, the
Third Circuit in Garrett viewed Spector as equating "plain, speedy
and efficient" to the prior equity standard of "adequate." 3 This
equation of the two standards is fundamental to the Garrett ratio-
nale. Just as prohibitive costs of individual suits or the likelihood
of a multiplicity of suits were sufficient bases for rendering state
remedies inadequate prior to 1937, the Garrett court reasoned that
they were sufficient to support a conclusion of inadequacy under the
Tax Injunction Act's standard.
Although other federal courts have rejected the argument that
prohibitive costs or a multiplicity of suits should preclude a finding
that a state remedy is "plain, speedy and efficient,"39 the Garrett
holding is supported by precedent. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.
v. Redwine,'0 a Supreme Court case decided 15 years after passage
of the Tax Injunction Act, involved a corporation's suit to enjoin
collection of state ad valorem taxes. The Supreme Court held the
state's legal remedy inadequate for two reasons: (1) a suit for a
refund of taxes paid under protest would have been applicable to
less than 15 percent of the taxes paid; and (2) the remedy provided
38. 538 F.2d at 67. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 979.
39. In Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973),
state remedies similar to those of Pennsylvania were found adequate under § 1341. Bland,
like Garrett, involved a suit for class-wide relief and the availability of a state equitable
remedy was arguably uncertain. See 51 TEx. L. REv. 999, 1008 (1973). Bland therefore pre-
sented the same issues which faced the court in Garrett. Although the Fifth Circuit rejected
the allegation that the state's equitable remedy was uncertain and could have rested its
finding of adequacy on that basis alone, it indicated that the state's statutory scheme was
also adequate. The court did not acknowledge that the expense and multiplicity of suits
created by the lack of a class action might render the statutory remedy inadequate. See id.
at 1009. Bland cited Charles R. Shepherd, Inc. v. Monaghan, 256 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1958) as
support for its finding of adequacy. In Monaghan, however, the adequacy of the state's
remedy was never contested. That case only considered whether the state's sales and use taxes
should be characterized as "taxes" within the meaning of § 1341, or as merely an arbitrary
and unlawful demand made by the state upon the plaintiff corporation. Despite its arguable
misapplication of precedent, Bland was cited with approval in Miller v. Bauer, 517 F.2d 27,
32 (7th Cir. 1975) (lack of class action at administrative appeal level held not to render state
remedy inadequate where consolidation of suits was allowed upon judicial review). Other
courts have also rejected the argument that multiplicity of suits or prohibitive costs are
sufficient bases for a finding of inadequacy. See Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766, 770 (5th Cir.
1967) (federal jurisdiction denied despite plaintiff's argument that state remedy was inade-
quate because it only afforded relief to individual taxpayers); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Lyons,
148 F. Supp. 787, 791-92 (S.D. Ill. 1957) (state remedy held adequate despite fact it would
necessitate instituting suits in 24 counties).
40. 342 U.S. 299 (1952).
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for arresting tax executions by filing affidavits of illegality and
would have required the plaintiffs to file over 300 separate claims
in 14 counties.4' In Husbands v. Commonwealth,4" parents of Penn-
sylvania school children brought an action in federal court challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a school reorganization plan. The par-
ents sought an injunction to prevent the levy of school taxes without
prior equalization of assessment ratios among the component school
districts within each unit. The district court held that although
Pennsylvania provided an administrative remedy followed by judi-
cial review, this procedure was intended to allow appeal of alleged
discrepancies in individual assessments; it would provide only a
piecemeal solution to the problem. 43 The court found the Pennsyl-
vania remedy inadequate under the Tax Injunction Act's standards.
Both the Redwine and Husbands courts based their findings of
inadequacy on the fact that application of the state remedy would
have led to a multiplicity of suits. However, neither the Supreme
Court nor the district court explicitly weighed the merits of its posi-
tion against the countervailing reasons for denying federal jurisdic-
tion. Tax policy is a matter of crucial state importance, affecting
such matters as the location of new industries and commercial en-
terprises. Resolution of cases involving state taxes should generally
be left to the state courts, which are likely to be better attuned to
the needs of the communities whose revenues might be reduced if
injunctive relief were granted." By failing to show why the concern
over a multiplicity of suits should outweigh these considerations,
the Redwine and Husbands decisions left uncertain when federal
courts should scrutinize state taxing schemes to insure that they
comply with the Federal Constitution.
The Garrett decision is more illuminating. It addressed the argu-
41. Id. at 303.
42. 359 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
43. Id. at 935-36.
44. See Clement, Discrimination in Real Property Tax Assessment: A Litigation Strategy
for Pennsylvania, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 285, 296 & n.53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clement],
citing Horn v. O'Cheskey, 378 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.M. 1974). In outlining the argument for
federal nonintervention, the Horn court observed:
[AI state's taxing scheme often involves highly complex administrative procedures
intertwined in the linguistic peculiarities of state statutes quite familiar to the state
administrators who constantly apply them, but similarly foreign to federal courts who
apply them on an intermittent ad hoc basis.
Id. at 1284.
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ments behind the federal doctrine of nonintervention underlying the
Tax Injunction Act 5 and determined that, under the facts in this
case, federal intervention would not necessarily result in a subver-
sion of the state's interest. The plaintiffs sought no more than equal-
ity in taxing rates. Since a decision in their favor might involve an
upward revision of the assessments of other property owners in the
taxing district, thereby increasing the county's revenues," interfer-
ence with state and local revenue collection was less significant.
Furthermore, the court indicated that even though the interests of
comity and federalism in some cases might be better served by
withholding federal equity jurisdiction, those interests are out-
weighed by the need to provide a forum for the presentation of
legitimate claims. 7 To deny these plaintiffs access to a federal court
would have been to deny them any remedy whatsoever, since they
could not afford the expense of pursuing individual appeals in the
Pennsylvania courts.
Garrett's approach to the application of the Tax Injunction Act
seems sensible. It accords with the interpretation given the words
"plain, speedy and efficient" by the Supreme Court in Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin."5 Moreover, federal courts
should be hesitant to deny federal jurisdiction when the state proce-
dure allegedly denies persons equal protection of the law. Yet the
impact of the decision is uncertain. If, for example, it were apparent
that federal intervention in a particular case would result in a reduc-
tion of state revenues, Garrett's precedential value might be les-
sened. The decision may prompt legislative revision of the existing
Pennsylvania statutory scheme to provide a class remedy for plain-
45. The court discussed the primary purpose behind the Act's passage. See note 30 supra
for an explanation of the congressional concern which led to passage of the Act.
46. If discriminatory assessment practices were proven, the county might decide to correct
the situation by raising the rate of assessments in the predominantly white sections of the
county, thereby increasing the county's tax revenues. 538 F.2d at 73.
47. Although the existence of the constitutional issue appeared to make more critical the
need for close scrutiny of the Pennsylvania remedies, the Garrett court did not intimate that
the existence of a constitutional claim would itself justify federal intervention; a showing that
the state remedy is inadequate is still essential to the proper exercise of federal equity
jurisdiction. Other cases have explicitly rejected the notion that the desirability of a federal
forum in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) should be sufficient to exclude such
cases from the prohibition of § 1341. See, e.g., American Commuters Assoc. v. Levitt, 405
F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (2d Cir. 1969) (bar of § 1341 applies to civil rights actions brought under
§ 1983). See also Clement, supra note 44, at 287-88.
48. 323 U.S. 101 (1944). See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
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tiffs who need one to avoid prohibitive costs and wasteful multiplic-
ity of suits in challenging a particular tax measure or method of
assessment. Regardless of whether such a legislative change is forth-
coming, the decision represents an expansion of federal jurisdiction
in the area of equitable relief from unconstitutional state taxes, a
result of particular importance to persons whose income prevents
them from pursuing individual appeals in the state courts.
John K. Heisey
